Oost-Europa, 1953-1960 - Geschiedenis en Didactiek

KEERPUNTEN IN DE
KOUDE OORLOG
VAN DE DOOD VAN STALIN
TOT DE BOUW VAN DE MUUR
1953-1961
Laurien Crump
Geschiedenis van de
Internationale Betrekkingen
Universiteit Utrecht
1953: ‘DE NIEUWE KOERS’
ONTSPOORD?
Na de dood van Stalin in maart 1953:
Collectieve partijleiding i.p.v. persoonlijkheidscultus
 ‘De nieuwe koers’ van de SU: retoriek of realiteit?
 Hervormingen in Oost-Europese landen
 Juni 1953: opstanden in Oost-Berlijn en de DDR
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http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collections
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http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113100
Wie is verantwoordelijk?
 Triomf van Ulbricht of van het Kremlin?
 De ‘Duitse kwestie’ op scherp

JUNE 02, 1953
OTTO GROTEWOHL’S NOTES ON
MEETINGS BETWEEN EAST GERMAN
AND SOVIET LEADERS IN MOSCOW
1955: EEN NIEUWE BUITENLANDPOLITIEK
Mei 1955: Toetreding BRD tot de NAVO
 14 mei 1955: Oprichting van het Warschaupact
(gemodelleerd naar Noord-Atlantisch verdrag)
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http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=14465
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_pcc/wapa_treaty.cfm vgl.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm
Politiek of militair? Communistisch?
 Bondgenootschap of ‘cardboard castle’?
 15 mei 1955: Neutraliteit Oostenrijk
 25 mei 1955: verzoening met Tito
 Sovjet troepen worden gereduceerd
 ‘Paradigm shift’ in buitenlandbeleid
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CHROESJTSJOVS GEHEIME TOESPRAAK:
PR OF NIEUWE POLITIEK?
Januari 1956: eerste Warschaupactvergadering
 Nieuwe doctrine: initiatief voor Oost-Europese landen
 Februari 1956: Chroesjtsjovs ‘geheime toespraak’

http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115995
Vreedzame co-existentie en einde
persoonlijkheidscultus
 Het vacuüm van de destalinisatie
 De gevolgen voor de relaties met
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China
De Oost-Europese volkeren
KHRUSHCHEV'S "SECRET SPEECH," DELIVERED AT THE
TWENTIETH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION, FEBRUARY 25, 1956
Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is excessively rude,
and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our
midst and in contacts among us Communists,
becomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one
holding the position of the Secretary General.
Because of this, I propose that the comrades
consider the method by which Stalin would be
removed from this position and by which another
man would be selected for it, a man, who above all,
would differ from Stalin in only one quality,
namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater
kindness, and more considerate attitude toward the
comrades, a less capricious temper, etc.”
DE IRONIE VAN LIBERALISERINGEN:
POLEN EN HONGARIJE IN 1956
Oktober 1956: Chroesjtsjov vs. Gomulka
 Okt./Nov. 1956: Poolse echo’s in Hongarije
 Verklaring 30 oktober 1956
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http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113647
Waarin gaan de Hongaren te ver?
 (Tweede) invasie: 4 november 1956
 Kremlin: doortastend of verward?
 Unilateraal of multilateraal?
 Geopolitieke omstandigheden?
 Rol van de Chinezen?
 Rol van het Warschaupact?

WORKING NOTES FROM THE
SESSION OF THE CPSU CC
PRESIDIUM ON 30 OCTOBER 1956
Khrushchev: We should adopt a declaration today
on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of
people's democracy (and consider these matters at
a session of the Warsaw Pact), taking account of
the views of the countries in which our troops are
based. The entire CPC CC Politburo supports this
position.
Bulganin: The Chinese cdes. have an incorrect
impression of our relations with the countries of
people's democracy.
1958-1959: CHROESJTSJOV OP DRIFT?
1958: Warschaupact vergadering over
troepenverminderingen
 Terugtrekking troepen uit Roemenië
 27 november 1958: ultimatum over Berlijn
 1959: bezoek aan VS (daarna pas China)
 ‘The spirit of Camp David’vs. Sino-Sovjet schisma
 De vooravond van de jaren zestig: (ont)spanning?
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http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118893
DECEMBER, 1959
MAO ZEDONG, OUTLINE FOR A SPEECH
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
Khrushchev and his group are very naïve. He does
not understand Marxism- Leninism and is easily
fooled by imperialism.
He does not understand China, to an extreme
extent. He doesn’t research [China] and believes a
whole bunch of incorrect information. He gives
irresponsible talks. If he doesn’t correct [his
mistakes], in a few years he’ll be completely
bankrupt (after 8 years).
He panics over China. The panic has reached its
extreme.
He has two main fears: imperialism and Chinese
Communism.
DE DUITSE KWESTIE
WEDEROM OP SCHERP
1961: Aantal vluchtelingen uit DDR neemt toe
 Juni 1961: mislukte top met Kennedy
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
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/156/berlin-wall
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http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110206
Chroestjsov staat onder druk van Ulbricht
 3-5 Augustus WP top: Gomulka vs. Ulbricht
 Conclusie: wel grenzen afsluiten, geen vredesverdrag
 13 aug. 1961: bouw van de muur, met WP goedkeuring
 Kennedy: ‘A wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.’
 Consolidatie van de Koude Oorlog?

Duitse kwestie bezegeld?
 Sino-Sovjet schisma onomkeerbaar?

NOTES ON THE CONVERSATION OF COMRADE N.S.
KHRUSHCHEV WITH COMRADE W. ULBRICHT ON 1
AUGUST 1961
N. S. Khrushchev: I have a technical question. How
will the border control be realized on streets in
which one side is in the GDR and the other is in
West Berlin? W. Ulbricht: We have a specific
plan. In houses with exits into West Berlin, they
will be walled up. In other places, barbed wire
barriers will be erected. The barbed wire has
already been delivered. It can all happen very
quickly. It will be harder with transportation
routes. We will the reconstruct the train platforms
of the city trains (S-bahn) and underground trains
(U-bahn) that go to West Berlin.