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illullt'ï,iifli'l ;,fiï[ ïlïï,ff
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survíve and keep oftering interestting activities
thanks to lrour lresh ideas! If you are ínterested or
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TYe
want ïOU
!
(ring voor Internationale Betrekkingen
v
ilii
KRnc voon INTERNATIONALE BETREKKTNGEN
Ëlobagl
Yot.l7(2) GLonAAl
Corurnrurs
,r,,
Vcfumq 17 Nb 2
Trianon: A Forgotten Treaty that Won't
Away
Go
5
Matthias Van Baelen & Wouter Wolfs
The Kosovo-issue and Europe's
Anne Foqué
role
12
How fapan's environmental disaster leads
17
to a clash of civilizations
Thomas Jansen
Canada and the Threat of a
fennifer Emond
Coalition
23
Activisme als risico: buitenlands beleid
28
onderBalkenende
Marieke Doolaard & Jan Rood
Calendar of KIB activities
39
t3l
KRING VOOR INTERNATIONALE BETRIKKn.IGEN
VoL.l1(2) Gr-onlq,r,
TRIRwoIU: A
KIB, Youn Evn oru rHE WoRLD?
Dear reader,
We are proud to present to you another issue of our magazine Globaal.
When watching the news and reading the papers these last months, one
couldn't help but wonder what the world had become. Protests in Tunesia
and Egypt started a wave of unrest and revolutions in the Arab world. In
Lybia, the worsening of the situation even led to an international
intervention. At the same time, we saw images of floating cars and airplanes
after the terrible earthquake and tsunami that hit fapan. Time to take
another good look at some developments on planet Earth.
In this issue of Globqql, we present to you the vision of young people
with a critical attitude. The authors of our articles this time are all students
or young graduates. We especially had great help from the students of the
MEPP-program, for which we thank them sincerely.
In our debate a few weeks ago about the Arab World - a road to
democracy? - we had a very lively and interesting discussion about past,
present and future of societal dynamics and political system in countries in
North Africa and the Middle East. In the next GIobaaI, we will certainly
come back to this topic. In this issue however, we shed light on some other
themes, that have perhaps been less on the front pages. Matthias Van
Baelen and Wouter Wolfs, both studying at Corvinus University in Budapest
at this moment did research on the impact of the Trianon treaty on
Hungary and Hungarian identity. Anne Foqué explores the recent
developments in Kosovo. Thomas Jansen gives us his opinion as a
japanologist on the Flemish press coverage of the crisis in Japan and
fennifer Emond makes an analysis of the political situation in her home
country Canada, a few weeks after the resignation of the government.
Finally, as a nice extra for our Dutch-speaking audience, we have an article
about Dutch foreign policy under the governments of Balkenende.
We hope that you will enjoy reading this new Globaal and look forward
to hearing whatyou think as well.
Leuven, April 2011
Anne Foqué - editor-in-chief
Inge Schroijen - president KIB
t4l
Yor.|7(2) Gr,on.q.A.L
Knn tc vooR. INTERNATIoNALE Bprru,rrrNcpN
FoncorrrN
TREATy rHAT woN'T Go AwAy
Matthias Van Baelen & Wouter Wolfs
"What has happened is a horror story of systematic destruction
of cultures, Ínvolving millions of Hungarians - still the
largest oppressed minority in Europe."
-
Balint Vazsonyi -
Hungary has been in the news lately with its environmental disaster in an
alumina plant in Kolontar and its notorious new media law. Although the
country is mostly associated with goulash and paprikas, it can look back on
a long and rich history. One document that has been central in Hungarian
history and still influences the country and even the whole of Europe today,
is the Treaty ofTrianon. This article tries to describe the historical context
in which this treaty came into being and in what way it still weighs on
contemporary politics, inside Hungary and beyond.
Trianon in
its
historical
perspective
Trianon was part of the treaties that
have been established in the
aftermath of the First World War
and is named after the Grand
Trianon Palace in Paris where the
Treaty was signed. On 4 fune \920 a
settlement was reached between
the allied forces (United
States,
France, Italy, United Kingdom and
Japan) and the Kingdom of
Hungary.1 To fully understand the
content and the formation of the
Treaty, we have to go back to the
events that occurred just before and
during the First World War.
Since 1867
the Kingdom of
Hungary had become part
of
the
Dual Monarchy Austria-Hungary
after the Settlement or Ausgleich.2
Although the new monarchy was
not comparable to the Habsburg
Empire of which Hungary was
liberated after the 7848-1,849
revolution, it still carried one of the
potential problems that provided
one of the roots for the collapse of
the Habsburg rule: the multiple
ethnicities. Fully aware of this
heritage, a number of laws were
created to protect the minorities
within the border of the Monarchy
in 1868.3 With these settlements
the situation was more or less
normalized until the First World
War broke out. Being at the losing
side in 1918, large parts of the
territory of Hungary were occupied
by neighbouring countries with
Allied support.a The Paris Peace
Conference, where the principle of
"self-determination of nations" was
proclaimed by American President
Woodrow Wilson, would arrange
the peace provisions. The settlements created the state of Czecho-
t5l
vol.l7(2) GLoBAAL
KRINc vooR INTERNATIoN^LE Bt: IRbKKtNGEN
slovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes (also known as
Yugoslavia) in l9lB. It is within [his
context that the Treaty of Trianon
was discussed.
Pícture: George Clemenceau and
Lloyd George leave the Trionon Palace
Hotel at Versaílles durÍng the Paris Peace
ConJeren.e, l9 19. (Source: www.omeri
c an h
ung
o ri q
nfede r atio n.o rg / i ma g es
/trí
KRI\(i vooR
What happened during the 90 years
after Trianon and what is the
current situation? Right after the
implementation of the Treaty,
Hungary demanded plebisciLes in
the lost territories about a possible
return to Hungary, referring to
Wilson's theory of "selfdetermination of people". The claim
was largely neglected except for the
area around the town of Sopron
(formerly given to Austria).- This
was the only alternation of the
Treaty of Trianon in favour of
Hungary. Just before the Second
World War, Italy and especially
Nazi-Germany under Hitler took
advantage of the slumbering
discontent over Trianon. Parts of
Southern-Slovakia and Transylvania were given back to the
Kingdom of Hungary under the so-
What was exactly in the Treaty of
Trianon? The most important issue
addressed in the Treaty is the new
border of Hungary. The total land
area would be reduced from
325,000 km'z to 93,000 km' or a
loss of approximately 72 per cent.s
The total population fell from 21 to
7,5 million inhabitants after these
Hungary and "given" to the
divisions. However painful and
the material and human
drastic these losses may have been,
it was especially the fate of the
ethnic Hungarians that was the real
Balint Vazsonyi also points at the
historical importance of some oÍ
these regions with for instance
Bratislava (Pozsony in Hungarian)
being the coronation town for
Hungarian kings for over 900
thorn in
Hungary's
flesh.
Approximately 3,3 million ethnic
Hungarians were detached from
Vor..17(2) CLoBAÀL
INTF,RNATIONALE tsETREKK]NGEN
called Vienna Awards, altering the
agreements made in 1920. Hungary
subsequently joined the Axis' side
in the World War. After the victory
of the Allied forces, the Treaty of
Paris in 1947 restored the borders
of the Trianon settlement.E
This situation remained
the
same until present day. The census
numbers of 200I-2002 therefore
show that still close to 2,5 million
ethnic Hungarians live outside of
the Hungarian border: 1,44 million
in Romania; 26,000 in Austria;
521,000 in Slovakia; 293,000 in
Serbia; 157,000 in Ukraine; 6,000 in
Slovenia; 17,000
in
Croatia and
1.5,000 in the Czech Republic.
FÍgure: The territoríal divisíons as they
were orranged in the Treaty ofTríanon
1 92
0
(S ou rce : h
ttp
:
/ /www.dv hh.o r g /
tn).
neighbouring countries: L,L million
to Czechoslovakiaj 1,7 million to
Romania; 600,000
to
Yugoslavia
and 26,000 to Austria. This meant
that close to a third of
the
Hungarian ethnic population were
living outside of the borders of the
Kingdom of Hungary. Apart from
losses,
years.6
t6l
I7l
vor..l7(2) GLoBÀÀL
KRrNG vooR INTITRNATl())tALl, BIiTREKKNGEN
Two remarks concerning these
numbers need to be made. The first
one is that when you compare these
numbers to the total population of
these countries it may not always
seem like it is a big issue, but this is
only one part oí the picture.
reality we see that
In
these
Hungarians live really concentrated
and that they are important ethnic
groups at regional level, for
instance in the Vojvodina region in
Serbia and in the South of Slovakia.
The second remark is that these
figures are in most cases
diminishing. Because of íear íor
Jobbík's political programme
consists of two main pillars: a
The shadow ofTrianon
The treaty of Trianon still casts its
shadow over contemporary Central
and Eastern Europe.
Especially
within Hungarian domestic politics,
the issue of Hungarian minorities in
the neighbourhood
countries
remains at the top of the agenda.
This is related to the shift in
nationalist direction which the
Hungarian political climate is
experiencing. In the last elections of
April 2010 two main winners could
be distinguished. Both of them
make full use of the minority issue
to gain support from the Hungarian
further assimilation, Hungary's calls
for an international recognition of
ethnic Hungarians living outside of
Hungary have only strengthened.e
Overall we can see why Balint
Vazsonyi refers to the Treaty of
Trianon as a "Bad Treaty that won't
population. The Ílrst winner is
lobbík, an extreme right party that
saw its electoral share rise from 20Á
in an opinion poll in 2009 to 17o/o in
the 2010 elections, making it the
go away" as 90 years after the
signing of the document, still 20,4
Parliament.
third party in the
per cent oí the total
ethnic
Hungarian population lives outside
tion of American
Hungorions at the BSth birthday ofthe
Pic tu re : Dem on stra
of the borders of the Republic of
Hungary.1o
Hungarian
T ria no
ca
n T rea ty
(So u
rce: hwww.amer í
nhu ng ar io nle de r o tio n.o rg / i mog es /Tri
o n o n De m o-2 0 0 5 N Y 1 Ig.j pg ).
/
-
Vor..l7(2) Gr,oBÀAt-
KRrN(; \'ooR l\TERN^Tl()\ALl: IIF.I RFtKKINGEN
radical discourse directed against
jews, gypsies and other immigrants,
and a pleading for the reunincation
of the Hungarian nation that was
"unjustly torn apart" by the
"dictate" of Trianon.rr The party
makes indeed no secret of its desire
to
reclaim Hungary's lost
territory.l2 The second and
biggest - winner of the 2010
elections was the centre-right party
FÍdesz. lls major landslide electoral
victory resulted in a trvo-third
majority in
the lJungarian
Parliament; a majority large enough
to unilaterally change the
Hungarian constitution. The first
year in office of lhe
Fidesz
issue of Hungarian minorities
abroad receives growing attention.
One of the first measures conducted
be the new Fldesz government was
the creation of the so
and communities of Hungarians
subordinated to the authority of
several states form part of the
united Hungarian nation, whose
cohesion over state borders is a
reality and the defining element oí
their personal and community selfidentitY".
attitude. The party wants to reduce
the Hungarian budget deficit for
example by imposing new taxes in
economic sectors that are
dominated by foreign companies,
such as the retail, energy and
telecom sector.L3 ln this way the
deficit can be reduced by "letting
the
the foreigners pay" and
the
Hungarian population is saved from
fu rther austerity cuts. Furthermore,
Fídesz wants to amend the
constitution with the statement that
the Hungary's only legal currency is
the forint,ra which entails a de facto
opt-out for the introduction of the
euro in the country.
It is not surprising that in this
climate of growing nationalism, the
Ls
Though this measure
government has been characterized
by an increasing nationalist
called
"Trianon Day"- The fourth of lune
the day when the treaty was signed
in 1920 - should from now on be
celebrated as the "Day of National
Unity". The Parliamentary bill that
legally embedded this new national
holiday, stated that "the members
was
mainly symbolic, Fidesz also took
around the same time a more
fundamental measure. The Fldesz
majority in Parliament adopted a
Iaw granting passports to ethnic
Hungarians living in other
countries.r6 However, this was just
a first step. At the beginning of this
year, the government went even
further and wanted to give all
Hungarians living
abroad
Hungarian citizenship and even the
right to vote in Hungarian
elections.lT Slovakia - the country
with the largest Hungarian minority
-
reacted almost immediately and
introduced Iegislation whereby a
citizen who voluntarily acquires the
citizenship of another country can
be stripped of Slovak nationality.ls
tet
This illustrates how the relations
between the countries in Central
and Eastern Europe can cool down
just overnight and how sensitive
minority issues still are. However,
not only nationalist
intentions
should be taken into consideration
concerning this legislative proposal
of
The large maiority of
Hungarians living abroad favour
this centre-right party over their
direct left-wing opponenl the
Fídesz.
Hungarian Socialist Party
M.'ZP.1e
An extension of the suffrage right to
the Hungarians in the neighbouring
countries would consequently
cause an incredible rise in Fidesz'
electoral support.
The influence of the minorig.'
problem is not strictly limited to the
relations between Hungary and its
neighbouring countries, but also
significantly affects the European
Union as a whole. The enlargements
of 2004 and 2007 have indeed
brought minority issues to the core
of the European Union. However,
during the accession talks leading
to EU-membership, the minority
question was predominately left
aside. Attention was primarily paid
to the implementation of the ocquis
communaut7ire, leaving the minority problems unsolved. But this
"sleeping problem woke up earlier
slovakia. During the Second World
War, the country's parliament in
exile adopted the so called "Benei
decrees", which gave legal ground
to the mass deportations of
Germans and Hungarians )iving in
Czechoslovakia after the war. ln
2007, Czech president Václav Klaus
demanded
Charter
an opt-out of the
of
EU
Fundamental Rights,
because this could render the BeneS
decrees as illegal.2l His refusal to
ratily the Lisbon Treaq./ submerged
the European project in uncertainty
for months.
Furthermore, minority problems
even undermine the external policy
of the European Union. Towards the
country that houses the largest EU
Common Security
and
Foreign
Policy mission, Kosovo,
the
European Union has difficulties
conducting a credible strategy,
since only 22 of the 27 EU member
states have recognized the country
so far. One of the main reasons of
non-recognition is the presence of
a
The refusal of the
minorities in former
t 101
medium sized country, deprived
from almost three quarters of its
land and more than two thirds oí its
population. It was an experience so
traumatic, that it still touches the
hearts and souls of the Hungarian
Wqshington Times, 04.06.2000.
Hungarian domestic affairs. Also the
European Union, a project that had
to provide an enduring solution
after WOII, is still affected by
Trianon, the "solution" proposed
after WOI. Trianon indeed is
Czecho-
a
forgotten treaq./ that won't go away.
1 G.
IESZENSZKY, Post-Communist
Nolional/ELhnic
EuropP ond /t5
Problems, Budapest, 2009, pp. 1'44-146.
2 Ibid., pp. 741.
3 G. HAMZA,'Traité de Paix de Trianon
et la protection des minorités
en
Hongrie' in: lournal of the Hístory of
treary that won't go away'
rr
Bad
in:
?re
jobbik.com/en_pol foreign. html.
12 www.politics.hu / 20090675 / )obbik
meps-to fight-for-pretrianon borders.
r3 www.ft.com/cms /s/o /c6c86ble-dac
1'1 1dÍ:81b0-001 44feabdc0.html#axzz1
F5DY2MKU.
14 www.euractiv.com/en/euro-fi nance/
hungary moves-closer-eurozone-opt-ne
ws-503861?utm-source=EurActiv+New
sletter&utm campaign=9Bc9Bad3d-my
_google analltics-key&utm medium=e
mail.
1s www.politics.hu /20700520 /frdeszto-declare-day of-national-unity.
16 www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/20 1 0 / 07 / 78 / ARZO1OO
71802529.htm1.
r7 www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/el
lnterndtíonal Lqw, -lO, (200A), 1, pp.
emzesck/Hungarianyo20Politics0/0201n-
t52.
Post Communíst
Depth 2011-Weeks.pdí
r3 w'l^nv.earthtimes.org/articles/news/
Nauonol/Ethnic
3 2 73
countries that haven't recognized
Kosovo yet(?J - the Hungarian
minoriry issue has prevented the
countries from recognizing Kosovo,
undermining the Union's policy
Problems, Budapest, 2009, pp. 744.
s
lbid.,pp.746.
6 B.
VAZSONYI, 'Commentary: Bad
treaty that won't go away'
Was
h
i
ng to
in:
Iàe
n T Í me s, 0 4.0 6.2OOO.
Post'Communist
7 G. IESZENSZKY,
Europe ond ll5
Nalionol/Ethnic
31,h ungary-laments'lost-territoryon trianon-day.html.
re www.policysolutions.hLl/userfiles/el
emzesek/Hungarian%20Politics%201nDepth 2011-Weeks.pdl
20 minorities.blogactiv.eu/2009 /77 /27 /
lisbon-tÍeàty resurre(ts-phantoms-of-
minorities in-the-new-europe/.
www.asil.org/insights09l 2 14.cfm.
2r
31bíd.
Conclusion
The treaty
Budapest,2009.
the country's political discourse.
But its relevance goes beyond
Problems, Budapest 2009, pp. 153.
Czech
JESZENSZKY, Post-Communist Europe
and lts National/Ethníc Problems,
1o B. VAZSONYI, 'Commentary:
4 G. JESZENSZKY,
Europe and /t'
towards that country.
e E.g.: L ROMS|CS, I'he Dismantling of
Historic Hungary: the Peace Treary of
Trianon 1920, New York, 2002 and G.
people today. This explains why
Trianon is still such a 'hot issue" in
significant minority. In the cases of
Slovakia and Romania two of the
than expected".2o
Republic to rati$/ the Lisbon Treaty
was the direct consequence of the
presence of Hungarian and German
Vor-.17(2) GLoBAAL
KRrN(i v(x)R IN-TERNATIoNALE BETRIKKINcUN
vol.l7(2) GLoBAAL
KRTNG \-ooR INTaRN^t toNAl.l-r BFtTREKKINcEN
of
Trianon was
Matthias Van Baelen and Wouter Wolfs are tvvo historians, currently en.olled in
a
milestone in the history of Hungary.
A glorious empire was replaced by a
the Master of European Politics and Policies at Kllleuven. They are now
studying for halfa year at Corvinus University in Budapest
llll
VoL.l7(2) CLoBAAL
KRrNc vooR INTERNATIoNALE BETREKKtNcUN
THE Kosovo-lssuE AND EURoPE's RoLE
Anne Foqué
"Wq the democratically-elected leaders ofour people,
hereby declore Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state."
- Declaration of Independence -
Three years ago, with these words, the Assembly of Kosovo declared
independence. Up until now, only 75 states have recognized Kosovo as a
sovereign state, of which some large countries such as the US. On the 10th of
luly,2010, the International Court oflustice said that Kosovo's declaration
of independence was no violation of international law. Only 22 of lhe 27
countries of the European Union recognized the country. However, despite
the obvious disagreement among its members about Kosovo's status, the
EU is playing a big role in the region and in Kosovo itseli Kosovo is
something that everybody seems to have heard ol but no one really knows.
This article tries to shed light on some themes that determine one of the
most pertinent issues in Europe's backyard.
1945, Kosovo was reintegrated into
Serbia. It was granted the status of
part of the Ottoman empire, which
then had significantly
weakened.2? At a conference in
London, it was decided that Kosovo
would be integrated in Serbia and
Montenegro, while Albania would
become a small independent state.
This was the result of a political
by
Kosovo is a political entity in the
Western Balkans with approximaïely 2 million inhabitants, of
which most are ethnic Albanians.
compromise between AustriaHungary on the one hand - afraid of
the emerging Serbian power - and
Russia and France on the other.
After the first World War, Kosovo
went to the kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes again, which
changed its name into Yugoslavia in
't
The 20u Century was for Kosovo a
period of constant
instability.
Together with Albania, it used to be
Ít2l
927.
During the second World War,
Italy occupied both Albania and
Kosovo. When partisan leader josip
Broz Tito founded his Federal
PeopJe's Republic of Yugoslavia in
Without support from
the
Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and
inLernal.ional community, this
experiment íailed miserably. UQK,
the Kosovarian liberation army,
became more and more popular,
Violence escalaled. When in
January 1999 in Rambouillet no
agreement was reached bet\,veen
because
Serbs and Croats, there seemed to
"autonomous region" and later of
"autonomous province". However, it
would never reach the level of
autonomy that the republics
(Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Montenegro) had,
Kosovarians were not Slavs and had
be no other option left
country",
problem
remained
a
Albania. This
one
hand
Kosovo
because on the
had a large degree of autonomy and
well functioning institutions, but on
the other hand, there was no real
international intervention,2s A few
citizenship and those institutions
did not carry the ultimate
management of Kosovo had begun.
an "external home
responsibility.
Historical context
vol.l7(2) GLOB^Al,
KRrN(i v()oR I\TT.TRNATtoNALF BETREKKINcEN
After the death of Tito and the
election of Slobodan MiloSevió as
president of Serbia in the eighties,
all autonomy was taken from
Kosovo and the region came under
the full authority of Belgrade.'z3
MiloSevió made the Kosovo-issue to
an instrument of Serbian
nationalism, with the Serbian-
cullural inheritance in
Kosovo as an important factor.
Combined with the problems of
Kosovarian nationality and identity
that had been there for decades,
this was catastrophical for the
situation. It resulted in a deadlock
of competing nationalisms, with
mutual exclusion and extreme
ortht.rdox
racism as a consequence.2a
When Yugoslavia fell apart in
1991,, Kosovo declared its
independence for a first time.
than
months later, NATO started its
bombings on Serhia.26 Finally, this
country was forced to give up its
control over Kosovo.
A long period of international
The United Nations installed an
interim administration in Pristina,
called UNMIK.z7 Since the
decldration o[ independence in
2008, the Kosovarians have taken
over many of the responsibilities of
UNMIK. Kosovo now has a
constitution, regular elections,
proper functioning institutions, a
judiciary system etc. That doesn't
hide the fact that the international
community remains omnipresent
and Kosovo is still very much
dependent on international
support, financial and otherwise.
European involvement
Ever since the end of the nineties,
the European Union was very much
involved in the international policy
towards Kosovo. However, it fails to
come
to a united position
on
recognition. Five member states are
tl3l
VoL.l7(2) GLOBÀÀL
KRINc v(x)R INTER\^troN^l-ti Bl, rRÈrKKtNcEN
opposed
to this:
Cyprus, Greece,
Romania, Slovakia and Spain.28 This
means that in its relations with the
EU, Kosovo is officially still defined
as in UN Security Council resolution
1244: essentially a part of Serbia, be
it under international supervision.
According to official EU documents,
they don't see this as a problem for
their relations with Kosovo,2e but
when visiting the country and
talking to people, one cannot help
but notice that this status-neutrality
- and more so the contradiction
between actions and discourse complicates the
relations
enormously. Furthermore, despite
the common will of
European
Today, Kosovo is still facing
important challenges. A central
problem remains the relationship
with Serbia and the need for
regional stability in the Balkans. It
was only five weeks ago, on the Bth
of March, that the Rrst direct talks
between Serbs and Kosovarians
since 1999 began. These talks were
supervised by the EU in the person
of High
Representative Catherine
Ashton. According to EurActiv, the
goal was to promote
regional
cooperation in the Western Balkans
and to develop a closer relationship
between the region and the
EU.3o
What would certainly not be
discussed, was the status issue.
of the principle of conditionality -
against Kosovo's independence and
is not likely to recognize the
country any time soon. After one
EU's
external policy - problematic. The
European Union tries to include
Kosovo in its broader policy
towards the Western Balkans and it
treats Kosovarian institutions de
facto as equal to the institutions of
its neighbouring countries. But
when it comes to ofÍicial relations,
this becomes very precarious. lt is
also entirely unclear what will
happen when Kosovo reaches the
point where it should normally be
considered
membership.
tl4l
for
candidate-
l()N^t
I
is still heavily
opposed
day, Edita Tahiri, depury prime
minister and negotiator for Kosovo,
seemed skeptical when she said in
Euobserver: "... if one side is stuck
in the past and the other is talking
about reality, matching-up is
difficult."3l However, the EU hopes
that working towards solutions for
some concrete issues can bring both
parties closer together.
As already mentioned, the
plays a big role.
EU
Kosovo's
EU is also
relationship with the
inevitably intertwined with that of
the rest of the Balkans. This
relationship is very amibiguous.
First there is the Union's side. The
vor.. l7(2) CI.0BAAL
lJt:TRFKKtNGtiN
the Balkan region. lts
member states to play an important
role in Kosovo, the unclear
standpoint on status makes the use
which is so vital for the
tF.RNA t
EU's strongest concern is stability in
Recent developments
Serbia
KRIN(i v(x)R IN
policy
towards Kosovo takes places in the
framework of the Stabilisation and
Association Process for the Western
Balkans. The EU wants sustainable
peace and democracy in the region,
so that it can eventually
be
integrated. As a consequence, it is
very much involved in democracy
promotion, minority protection and
capacity and institution building in
Kosovo. On the other hand, the
status issue remains unresolved,
which remains a problem íor real
engagement and a relationship
institutions and individuals, in
order to maintain a certain degree
of order and stability in the region.
In January this year, the Guardian
published an article on the
involvement of Hashim Thagi,
Kosovo's prime minister, in
organized crime, saying that
"western powers backing Kosovo's
government have had extensive
knowledge of its criminal
connections for several years."3'
These rumors of course don't add to
the EU's credibility in Kosovo.
based on equality.
Kosovo oí course regrets this
"double track policy" and is very
critical towards the EU's actions EULEX for instance is very
unpopular. Moreover, Kosovarians
want to avoid at any cost being
under foreign occupation "again", as
they feel they have been forever.
They want to be independent and
responsible for their own wellbeing.
However, the young country is well
aware that it needs the help of the
international community,
and
of
the
European
Union,
to
especially
reach these goals. Kosovo's future
will inevitably be European.
A big problem for Kosovo (and
perhaps for the Balkans in general)
remains the widespread corruption.
The EU condemns this of course,
but at the same time, it is blamed
for not taking strong action against
it. It is said that the EU is even
willingly cooperating with corrupt
Ilashin
Thaqi
The road ahead
Three years aíter Kosovo's
declaration of independence, the
opinion is widespread that this is an
evolution that cannot be reversed.
For the European Union, there is no
way back either. Kosovo is
tl5l
voL.l
KRTNG VooR INTI.:RNATIONALE tsETREKKINGFN
unavoidably going
to integrate in
the EU. That does not
mean,
however, that a solution for the
status issue is getting any closer.
Very important in this respect is
also the EU-Serbia relationship.
How will the Union find a balance
here? For Serbia, Kosovo is a very
sensitive subject that touches the
core of people's identities. Can this
be overcome? And which path will
the EU follow regarding matters of
corruption? Many questions
regarding Kosovo rema in
unanswered. As months and years
go by, it will become clearer how
the situation in the Balkans will
evolve and which dynamics will
steer its development. Moreover,
we will see how the EU will cope
with this delicate situation, in a
time and on a subject where it
becomes more complicated every
day to develop a common policy.
,,
J. KER-LINDSAY, Kosovo: The Poth to
Contested Stotehood in the Balkans,
Londen, I.B. Tauris, 2009, B e.v.
,r A. LEBOR, Slobodan Miloíevié:
biografe, AmsteÍ dam, Uitgeverii Balans,
2002,3+9 e.v.
24 V. STEVANOVIC, Miloievió, une
épitaphe, Parijs, Librairie Arthème
Fayard, 2000,93.
,s M. WELLER, Kosovo's Struggle for
7(2 )
Cr.oB4 {L
ENTAL DISASTER LEADS TO A CLASH OF
,6
NAVO, KFOR: Confict Background,
18.04.2007
CIvILIZATIoNS
Thomas lansen
{http://www.nato.int/kfor/docu/about
/background.html).
,7
IJNITED NATIONS
1244
COUNCIL, Resoiution
s
SECURITY
(1999),
/ RES / 7244 (7999), 10.06.1999.
also the article about the Trianon
treaty in this same issue.
,e "[...] notwithstanding EU Member
States' differing positions on Kosovo's
23 See
ol
slatus, the approach
recognition, but unity
in
diversity
in
engagement
provides a construclive basis for
progress." EUROPESE COMMISSIE,
Kosovo - fullilling its European
Perspective, COM[2009) 5343, Brussel,
14.70 .2009 , 4.
30 Serbia-Kosovo talks open under
Ashton's
08.03.2011
watch,
Ihttp ://www.euractiv.com/en/enlarge
ment/serbia-kosovo-talks-openashtons-watch-news502847?utm-source=EurActiv+Newslet
ter&utm campaign-9ee02bBe63my-google-analytics-key&utm_medium
=emaill.
31 A. RETTMAN, Kosovo negotíator:
Serbia is stuck in the past, EuobseNer,
0s.03.2011
(http://euobserver.com / 9 / 319 54 / ? rk=
1).
',
P. LEWIS, Report idenlílies Hoshim
Thatí as'big fsh'ín organised crime,
24.07.2077
guardian.co.uk,
Ihttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20
7l / jan /24 /hashim-tha
organised-crime).
ci-
kosovo-
lndependence, Oxíord, Oxford University
Press,2009,107-149.
Anne Foqué studied history and international politics at KULeuven. In 2010, she
wrote her master's thesis on democracy promotion by the EU in Kosovo.
l16l
vol.l7(2) GLoBAAL
KRrN(i v(x)R INr ÊRNATIoNAI-E BFTREKKTNGEN
Fleinish media have reported extensively on the disaster in Japan. However,
many reports,, analyses and columns, were exactly an example of our
meager knowledge on other cultures and languages in this increasingly
globalizing world. The East seems to provide a mirror for the West: what
lessons can we learn?
What happened?
Let us first start with the facts and
the information the media provides
us with, in a second part
I will
dispense some of my own thoughts
as a lapanologist.
The 11th ofMarch 2011 is a date
that will be forever known in the
hearts of all fapanese people. On
that fateful day at exactly 14h46
Tokyo time an off-shore 9.0
earthquake triggered a 30m high
tsunami which obliterated the
entire eastern coastline of the
Tóhoku area. Approximately 11,000
people lost their lives, with
a
further 16,000 missing
and
rendering countless more homeless.
To give you an idea, that is almost
the entire student population of KU
Leuven, Prime Minister Naoto Kan
announced that this was japan's
worst crisis since the end of World
War II.
But whereas previous
major
earthquakes in 1923 and 1995 had
mainly destroyed large parts of
respectively Tokyo and Kobe, the
current crisis soon evolved into a
nuclear problem- The cooling
systems of several nuclear power
plants were disabled by the
earthquake and tsunami. The most
famous nuclear power plant of all
certainly must be the troubled
Fukushima I. "WORSE THAN
C11ERNOByL"33, ïAPANESE
RADIOACTIVE CLOUD MOVING TO
EUROPE"34, "NUCLEAR DISASTER
IN
BELGIUM ONLY MATTER OF
TIME"35, these are examples of the
headlines in some Flemish media.
What happens in Japan does not
stay in Japan. Local earthquakes
and tsunamis of the 21't century
have become globalized, affecting
us all. So what is the sovereign
nation of fapan doing about it?
The Flemish media were quick
to send journalists to lapan and find
out. Packed with professor Vande
Walle's (KUleuven) book
geschíedenis
vtn Japan:
'Een
van
somourqi tot soft powel36 and other
text books37, they would report on
the human misery and even offer us
a window into Japanese mentality.
The Flemish news broadcast of
public TV station'Eén'was one oí
l7l
vor-.17(2) CLoBAAL
I(RINC V(X)R INTERNATIONALF BÊ'TREKKINGEN
the first on the
scene. They
reported the story of a Japanese
vegetable grower. Apart from losing
his house and loved ones, his entire
of mercury into the bay. Only 14
years after the first discovery of this
malicious practice, and in the face of
much social uproar, the Court found
crop had become radioactive and he
Chisso negligent and ordered the
payment of compensations.3s The
effects of radioactive ground water
caused by 'Fukushima I' could be
even more detrimental to the
immediate surroundings.
for its
insufficient efforts. But not only
lamented the government
human interest was addressed. Eén
also provided the public with
critical and independent up-to-date
information with regards to new
developments. For example, a blue-
collar government spokesman was
translated as saying that the entire
area in a 20km radius of
'Fukushima I' was declared safe.
Immediately afterwards,
they
interviewed a Belgian Greenpeace
activist who did his own
measurements for radiation on the
scene. He found it scientifically
absurd that the fapanese could
claim such a thin& for
measurements by Greenpeace
showed quite the opposite. ln short,
the public was led to the conclusion
that the Japanese government was
entirely incredible. This was
Western critical tournalism at its
best asking the tough questions.
Throughout history,
indeed,
corporate fapan and
the
government have not enjoyed a
good track record when it comes to
managing environmental issues in a
quick and adequate manner. One of
the most famous examples is that of
Minamata on the island of Kyushu.
This tiny fishing town lost a third of
its
inhabitants because
Chisso
Corporation had dumped 600 tons
llsl
Flemish quality newspapers
such as 'De Morgen' and 'De
KRIN(i v(x)R INI LRNATIo\At
Nothomb. lt obviously influences
her conclusion tremendously,
namely that the Japanese (and even
Japanologists she adds) are affected
Japanese
conduct. "The Japanese are very
proud of their humble, respected
and honourable people, but little
if we look at the first
of mass graves (.1
Previously one of the richest
countries in the world has
transformed into a third world
remains
pictures
country", was written in an article
of the 'De Morgen'. 'De Standaard'
even published a column providing
us some insight into lapanese
mentality. "Why does nobody run
screaming into the street to show
his impotence and grievance? (...) I
find this shockingly in-human (...) I
detest the rigourous code of
conduct by which every Japanese is
captured." These are the insightful
words of Kristl Strubbe, who is a
local liberal politician from
Mechelen and a former journalist at
commercial TV station VTM. She
continues with an analysis of
Japanese society, based on the
Belgian novel 'Stupeur et
tremblements'ro
by
Amélie
He actually said that radiation
levels had risen, which would be
more in line with
Greenpeace
that
prevents any individual thoughlao
There are more examples of such
narrow-minded visions, but let us
conclude the descriptive part and
measurements after all. More
erroneous translations leading to
very different stories can be found
on Youtube, where Japanologist
Werner Vanhorenbeeck is trying to
raise public awareness of Eén's
move to a deeper analysis.
deontologya2.
by a hierarchical structure
A lapanologist's View
Standaard' were more inequivocal
in their critique on
vol.l7(2) Gl.oBAAl.
F BI]TRF.KKINGEN
The first thing a
.lapanologist
notices when consulting Flemish
media is the mere lack of
knowledge on Japanese society.
Primary sources are rarely used,
secondary sources are blindly
copied, and one hundred year old
clichés fuel a biased view on a
country most ofus have never been
to. The reports of Eén's
distinguishedal news service,
mentioned above, are a clear
testimony of Flemish so-called
'qualitative journalism'. The
translation of a vegetable grower
was in íact a fabrication to suit the
story the editor-in-chief wanted to
bring, namely one of distrust
towards the Japanese government.
What the man really said
in
lapanese was that he appreciates
the shelter home being given to him
and that everyone will work hard to
recover from this disaster. The
blue-collar government spokesman
was also 'misinterpreted'. In fact he
did not declare the 20km radius
around Fukushima I to be safe at all.
If there is one thing that Flemish
media is even more critical about, it
must be their local competition. De
Standaard and Knack published the
findings of Werner Vanhorenbeeck,
which led to a rather tucked away
rectification on Eén's website,
stating that some "minor mistakes
were made in
translating
reports".43 "We depend on news
agencies for our reports and
checking translation is a costly
procedure," says editor Bjórn
Soenen, "sometimes
we rely
on
Japanologists and professors.
Yesterday even the lapanese
girlfriend ofone ofour editors had a
look at the videos"aa. However, it
remains unclear to the ,apanology
community who in íact these
students and professors are and
whether the editor's girlfriend is a
certified translator. And there really
aren't that many in Flanders when
it comes to Japanese. What is clear,
though, is that Flemish media see
no harm in blindly
copying
secondary sources without first
checking them and try to adopt the
story to what the public wants to
see: usually one oísensational panic
Ilel
Vc) .17(2) GLOBAAL
KRING vooR INTERNATIoN^LE BItTRItKKTNCI-tN
a political
and chaos. That is after all what the
Western public expects with such a
unsafe. Clearly
disaster-
constituents. The preservation of
And here perhaps lies
the
difference between Flemish and
Japanese society. Frank Furedi,
professor of Sociology at University
o[ Kent, explains thal the West is
blinded by a culture of fear. "A
couple of years ago, we experienced
major floods in the UK. Instead of
helping out cleaning up and learn
from our mistakes, people reacted
with
panic, anger
and
asserts
He further
that this culture oí fear actually
makes us irresponsible and
scapegoating".
fatalistic in the wake of danger. "We
Iose our crisis management
potential, and instead of taking up
choice
fueled by panic among
her
one's individual well-being seems
to be paramount in the face of
danger.
This is supposedly in
stark
contrast with Japanese society.
Often it is said by Western
commentators that the Japanese
feeling of belonging to a collective
suppresses individualism. lt creates
an umbrella which removes every
sense of responsibility. In a sense
there is some truth in
this
observation. Japanese corporate
history has abundant examples of
corporate leaders stepping down,
taking a hit for the team, whilst not
honestly realizing the wrongness of
KRNc vooR INTER\AT()NÁr.F IIFTRFKKT\arF\
Construction requirements became
stricter, the response of the
government was critically reviewed
[it is the reason why the current
prime minister is dressed in a blue
rescue uniform and not his tailormade suit) and crisis management
was improved. It has made Japan
one of the safest places to be in the
wake of disaster. Just to compare:
when hurricane Katrina hit New
Orleans, much of the public
authorities' focus was on dealing
with countless individual and classaction lawsuits brought against it,
leaving reconstruction still in an
ongoing process. This is not to
criticize
Western
crisis
management, but it would be
immensely arrogant to think that
responsibility, we blame others. (..)
With the disaster in Japan, Western
media did not only seek panic, but
even created it."4s This assertion
could be evidenced by the rush on
their actions. But this kind of
system also has its merits in
lapanese culture, else it would
probably not survive anyway. A
possible theory is that this umbrella
)apanese conduct actually proves to
be highly practical and efficient in
its own cultural environment, even
Even
though Brussels is 9,500 kilometers
collective actually allows
people to equally share the burden
downfalls.
removed from Tokyo, people here
fear for their own lives and those of
their children. Media attention to
for
pragmatic solutions shared by all.
There is a fapanese catchphrase
iodine tablets in Belgium.
the necessity of iodine tablets,
sensational headlines and
misplaced campaigns by
government picturing people who
wear tinfoil hats only adds to the
impression of impending danger.
But the ramifications of such panic
are not restricted to trivial conduct.
German Chancellor Merkel closed
down seven nuclear power plants
which were suddenly deemed to be
[20]
of the
of responsibility, allowing
that
embodies lhis. " onato no
kokoro, 0n0ta no utsukushisa". Il
means "your heart, your beauq."',
which is an encouragement for you
to become beautiful not only to
yourself but also to those around
you.a6 lt also does not exclude
individuality.
When Kobe was struck by a 6.8
earthquake in 1995, many fapanese
continued with their
lives.
what works here, should work
everyruhere. This is especially so if
though it comes with
clear
It also does not mean
everyone is uncritical of
government. The many grassroots
environmental movements in lapan
(e.g.
in
Minamata, Sanrizuka et
cetera), are a clear testimony of
this. This more nuanced point of
view is rarely addressed in media
attention on Japan.
Building bridges
So, is there something we can learn
from the Japanese? Yes, but not that
we need to be more stoical, more
Vor..l7(2) Gt.oBAAL
collective et cetera. It would most
likely not work in the West, because
perhaps we lack the necessary
mindset. One could even question
whether all Japanese really are
stoical and collective. Instead,
Japanese conduct provides us with
an opportunity to see how 'ununiversal', how local our Western
point of view really is. Accepting
there are other ways to deal with a
crisis could inspire us in our own
cultural evolution, also possibly
leading to less chaos, less panic and
better policy decisions both
domestically and internationally.
But first one needs to look beyond
the negative points of another
culture.
For that we need bridges across
cultures. Globalization has made the
world a tinier place, but at the same
time makes it even more painfully
clear that mindsets are still rooted
in local impressions of reality. More
than before, there is a need lor
people who want to make that
bridge: fapanologists, Sinologists,
Arabists, but also sociologists,
international relations students and
so forth. Many people ask me why I
immersed myself into fapanese and
Asian society. I tell them that you
only get to know your own culture
if you immerse yourself into
another. Studying and Iiving in
lapan for a long time actually made
me more curious about my own
cultural/political system
and
therefore I am now studying
European Politics and Policies in
[2t]
vol.l7(2) GI,OBAAL
KRN(; v(x)R INïtiR\ATIo\ALE BIt TRIiKKINGEN
the hopes
I
can acquire a better
understanding of this world.
Also media and policy makers
can benefit from more nuanced
insights into other cultures and
systems, and especially one's own.
They do not necessarily need to be
those advocated in this paper, for I
am sure many others [including
will not agree with
everything I say. But to the very
lapanologistsJ
least there should be an awareness
of our cultural biased point of view,
allowing for an open and critical
discussion across cultures. After all
-and this is a
fear-inducing
statement revealing my Western
mentality- history has shown on
many occasions to what cultural
prejudice or a clash of civilizations
can lead to.
Ezra Eeman
Albin
Strubbe.
'ledereen Senpai!'. 21 March 2011.
a] Two weeks prior to the reports on
Japan, they won an industry-awarded
'Televisiester'. Deredactie.be, 25 feb
2011, "Nathalie Meskens schittert op
Televisiesterren".
a2 See
Youtube.com, http://www.
youtube.com/user/GUISpandex,
a3
Deredactie.be,
24
March
201 1, http://www.deredactie.be/cm/vr
tnie uws/cu ltu u roloZ B eno/o?Bmedia/ me
dia / 1 .9 4387 B.
aa De Standaard. 30 March 2011; Knack,
see
Deredactie.be, 22 March 2011.
De Morgen, 4 April 2011.
36 vande Walle, willy. Een geschiedenís
von lapon: von samourai tot soft power.
Leuven: 4cco, 2009.
37 To give you an idea of the 'crash
course Japan' many journalists throw
themselves into, see the list of books on
the Twitter account of VTM iournalist
polítícql sciences student lennifer Emond shores her thoughts on Canqd(r.
1999.
ao De Standaard. Kristl
3s
April 2011.
each edítíon of Globoal, qn intematíonal student ís given the
opportunity to write something about hís home country. This time,
In
Michel,
3a
De Morgen, 2
fennifer Emond
twitter.com/ezraeeman.
33 Karan, Pradyumna P.Japan Ín the 21st
Century: Environment, economy and
soclery. Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 2005, p.361-362.
3e Nothomb, Amélie. Stupeurs et
30 March 2011.
as De Standaard, 19 March 2011. Also
33
CANADA AND THE THREAT oF A CoALITIoN
on 14 March, hnp://
Tremblements. Paris:
http://www.frankfuredi.com/index.
php /site / article /445/.
46 Brian Moeran. "lndividual, Group and
Seishin: lapan's lnternal Cultural
Debate". ln Japonese Culture and
Behaviour. Selected Readings, ediled by
Takie Sugiyama Lebra and William P.
Lebra. Honolulu: University of Hawaii
On March 25, 2077, members of all opposition parties in the Canadian
parliament supported a vote of no-confidence, leading to the adiournment
of the 40th Parliament of Canada and the fall of the Harper government. For
the fourth time in seven years, the Canadian electorate will go to the polls.
This event sparks a particular interest in Belgium, where comparisons are
often drawn between the tlvo countries as both operate under a federal
system, have had recent difficulties maintaining or creating a government,
and both are marked by significant linguistic cleavages. The principle
difference between the two, however, is that unlike in Belgium, Canadians
rest assured that immediately after the elections on May 2, 2011, a
goyernment will be formed. Where in Belgium, multiple political parties
must come together to form a coalition government, in Canada, this form of
governance is almost unheard of until recently. In fact, the so-called threat
of a coalition has become a major issue for the upcoming election. In the
Canadian context, many citizens fear that the creation of a coalition
government would be undemocratic or unconstitutional. It is Canada's
political culture and political hÍstory that can account for this
misunderstanding and for the key differences between Canadian and
Belgian politics.
A
Canada
monarchy
is a
if they do not win an
absolute majority. The party with
the most seats in the House of
elected even
BriefHistory
Press, 1986, pp.62-79.
Thomas Jansen studied lapanese Studies at KULeuven and international law at
Kyushu University in Japan. He is currently enrolled in the Master oí European
Politics and Policies at KULeuven.
constitutional
that functions as
Westminster-style
a
federal
parliamentary democracy. In other
words, the Canadian government is
structured according to the British
system. Elections follow a "first past
the post" model, where the
candidate with Lhe most votes is
I22l
vol.l7(2) GLoBAAL
KRINc v(X)R INTERT'r^TIONALE BETREKKIN(iEN
Commons
will form the government
and the party leader is
named
Prime Minister. After an election,
two possible types of government
can be formed. If the ruling party
has an absolute majority of seats in
the House of Commons, they form a
majority government. When the
party that holds the most seats in
l23l
VoL.l7(2) Gl,oBAAr,
KRtN(i vooR INTIRNAI-toNAl.E BETREKKlN(iliN
the House holds fewer seats than all
to funding issues, such as
of the opposition parties combined,
a minority government is created.
federal budget.
In many countries that stem
from the Anglo-Saxon tradition,
to a motion of
(Australia, New Zealand, the United
States
for
example), there
is
a
tendency towards the dominance of
two parties - typically one left win&
and the other right wing. The same
is true in Canada with the Liberals
slightly left of centre, and the
Conservative Party more to the
right. A notable difference
in
Canadian politics, however, is the
significant presence of regional
parties - the Bloc Québécois only
presents candidates in the province
of Québec and has
seen
considerable success.
no-confidence,
however, this time there was more
at play. When opposition
supported the vote oí
confidence, they were
MP's
noalso
supporting a motion that declared
the Harper government in contempt
of Parliament. On March 9, 2011,
Speaker of the House of
Commons, Peter Milliken, issued a
report declaring the government to
be in contempt of Parliament by
the
failing to
disclose
financial
information about key government
projects. Milliken's report was most
notably referring to the cost oí a
deal to purchase new F-35 nghter
the
government's crime policy. This
report was sent to the House affairs
From 1993 until 2004, the Liberal
Chrétien
maintained a majority government
through three consecutive elections.
Since then, neither the Liberals nor
the Conservatives have been able to
achieve a majority government. In
2008, tust two years after the
previous elections, Prime Minister
Stephen Harper asked the Governor
to dissolve Parliament as
he felt it was no longer operating
productively. Adjourning the
Parliament can also be achieved
General
through a loss of supply or a vote of
no-confidence. While both indicate
a lack of confidence in the
government, the former is specific
I24l
The recent events in Canada led
jets and of the price of
Why the Government Fell
Party under lean
the
committee which, on March 21,
ruled in favour of Milliken.
Michael lgnatieff, the leader of
the Liberal Party, called for a
motion of no-confidence and was
supported by the other two
opposition parties, the
New
Democratic Party [NDP), and the
Bloc Québécois. While one would
assume that this would become a
key issue in the current electoral
campaign, surprisingly, the
contempt of parliament charges
have taken a back-seat to the
"threat" of a potential coalition
government.
VoL.l7(2) GLoBÀAL
KRIN(J VOOR INTF,RNATIONÀLE BETREKKINCiEN
The Threat ofa Coalition
Immediately following
the
dissolution of Parliament, Stephen
Harper issued the following
statement: "UnfortunatelÍ
Mr.
lgnatieff and his coalition partners
in the NDP and Bloc Quebecois
made abundantly clear that they
had already decided they wanted an
election instead, Canada's fourth
election in seven years, an election
Canadians had told them clearly
that they did not wanl"
The
Conservatives imply that the vote of
no-confidence was simply a way for
the Liberals to come to
power
- a word often
menacingly accompanied by terms
such
as
undemocratic,
unconstitutional, and illegitimate. It
is clear that a coalition government
through a coalition
is none of
these things and that
many countries around the world
operate under such a system as
means of institutionalized
cooperation between
several
political parties. Indeed, Canadians
do not view these countries as
undemocratic or illegitimate. But
why, then, are Canadians so weary
of a coalition government in
Canada?
In 2008, right before
Stephen
Harper requested the dissolution of
Parliament because
it
was not
functioning effectively,
an
interesting phenomenon occurred
in the Canadian political and social
scene. The Liberals, the NDP, and
the Bloc, were in negotiations to
potentially bring down the Harper
government and the latter touted
the danger of an illegitimate
"coalition". Pro-Coalition and Anti-
Coalition rallies were
held
throughout the country aided by
social media and networking sites
such as YouTube and FaceBook.
Such fervent political activity is not
the norm in Canada, where voterturnout rates are relatively low.
This issue though, drew out the
activist in many who felt that the
creation of a coalition would
undermine the legitimately elected
Conservative government. What
many Canadians neglected or failed
to
was that the
had a minority
understand
Conservatives
government, with only 724 out of
308 seats in the House. The creation
ofa coalition, while not traditionally
done, is by no means unconstitutional or illegitimate.
Three years later, Canadians are
faced with the same story: a
Conservative Party not able to
achieve a majority, and a Liberal
Party willing to cooperate with the
Bloc and the NDP. Where the
Liberals contend that Harper's
Conservatives are undemocratic
and not responsible to their
electorate as demonstrated by the
contempt of Parliament charge, the
Conservatives claim that the
Liberals are looking to form a
coalition. This threat is quite
intelligent as it feeds offthe political
culture of Canada where coalitions
are unknown and misunderstood.
t2sl
VoL.l 7(2) GLoBAAt,
KRtN(i vooR INTtRNAt toNALE BETREKKIN(iFN
Perhaps the biggest cause of this
fear o[ this misunderstanding
In
several weeks
parties for a coalition. ln order for a
coalition to be truly formed within
agreement
and the Liberals. The reality is that
that politicians and citizens mistake
cooperation between opposition
Canada, a
formal
between parties would need to be
made and specific division of
executive power between the
parties would take place. This does
not include the informal talks that
take place causing one party to vote
a certain way, to support a specific
motion, or to come together in a
vote of no-confidence as has just
happened. The latter events are
simply the political reality that
exists in a minority government
situation.
5
U
l'.{
o
$u
g
time,
will head to the polls and
a new government will be formed.
The Conservatives hope to gain a
majoriB/ by attracting voters who
sit in-between the Conservatives
is
E
Canadians
cl
if the
Liberals do form a coalition
with the NDP and the Bloc, parties
significantly more left-wing, they
will need to adjust their policies to
the left. Therefore, the issue of a
coalition is an important one as it
É
t,o
Belgium, the formation of a
coalition government is not
CL
c
t!
vo
will
impact the resulting
government. However, unlike in
necessary therefore, Canadians
gr^
will
l!
more likely than not continue to be
governed by yet another minority
government,
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VOL.l7(2) GLoBAAI,
KRtNc vooR INTERN^-ltoNAI-E BETREKKTN(;EN
wisselende samenstelling
AcrtvlsME ALs Rlstco: BU|TENLANDS BELEID oNDER BALKENENDE
Marieke Doolaard & fan Rood
0p 22 juli 2002 Íad het eerste door lan-Peter Balkenende geleide kabinet
aan. Dit was het begin van een acht jaar durende periode waarin zijn vier
regeringen verantwoordeli jk waren voor het Nederlands buitenlands
beleid. Wat heeft deze periode Nederland op buitenlands-politiek terrein
gebracht? Hoe staat het buitenland er in Nederland acht jaar later voor? En
valt er na vier kabinetten-Balkenende iets te zeggen over de toekomstige
orièntatie van het Nederlands buitenlands beleid?
aan de Amerikaans-Britse inter-
Van Srebrenica naar Uruzgan
Zowel het aantreden van het eerste
kabinet-Balkenende in 2002 als de
val van zijn vierde kabinet in de
vroege ochtend van 20 februari jl.
hield verband met c.q. was het
gevolg van Nederlandse (militaire)
betrokkenheid bit internationale
kwesties.aT Balkenende I trad aan
nadat op 16 april 2002 premier
Wim Kok het ontslag van zijn
tweede paarse kabinet
had
ingediend naar aanleiding van een
kritisch NIOD-rapport over
Nederlandse rol
tijdens
de
het
Srebrenica-drama. Balkenende IV
viel op zijn beurt over onenigheid
binnen de coalitie over voortzetting
van de militaire missie in Uruzgan.
Daarbij was vóór dat noodlottige
moment de sfeer binnen het
gezelschap al behoorlijk bedorven
door de kritische conclusies van het
begin dit jaar verschenen rapport
van de Commissie-Davids over de
wijze van besluiworming door het
demissionaire eerste kabinetBalkenende inzake politieke steun
[28]
ventie in Irak in maart 2003.
De ironie derhalve is dat actieve
(militaire) betrokkenheid
Nederland bij
van
internationale
conflicten zowel aan de wieg als aan
het graf van de kabinetten-
Balkenende heeft gestaan. Een
constatering die onderstreept dat
alhoewel buitenlandse politiek de
afgelopen verkiezingen geen enkele
electorale
gespeeld,
rol van betekenis heeft
het zelfoerkozen inter-
nationaal activisme een polítieke
risicolqctor van grote betekenis is
geweest voor
opeenvolgende
kabinetten.as
Van Fortuyn naar Wilders
De val van het tweede paarse
kabinet markeerde bovendien de
overgang naar een periode van
grote politieke veranderingen en
instabiliteit in eigen land.
De
samenstelling van de Balkenende-
kabinenen zelve is
KRIN(;vooRINTERNATT0N^I-EBErRF.KKrNcr.tN Vol..I7(2)GLOBAAL
daarvan
welhaast de beste illustratie. Onder
zijn Ieiding heeft het CDA in
van
meerderheids-, minderheids- en
demossionaire kabinetten geregeerd met LPF, WD, D66, PvdA en
ChristenUnie; een op zich zelf al
opmerkelijk breed politiek
spectrum van onverenigbaarheden.
De kortstondige samenwerking
binnen het instabiele kabinetBalkenende I stond daarbij model
voor de opstand tegen de politieke
elite onder de noemer van de
Fortuyn-revolutie; een opstand die
onder leiding van Geert Wilders en
zijn PW een voortzetting heeft
gekregen en
populistisch-
nationalistische trekken heeft
verworven. Dat deze omwenteling
drie dominerende centrumpartiien
CDA, PvdA en WD. Buitenlandse
politiek was bovendien - enkele
korte oprispingen van maatschappelijk verzet rond kruisraketten en
het neutronen-wapen daargelaten
-
geen onderwerp van omvangrijke
publieke polarisatie. Integendeel,
het kon onder de bevolking op een
'permissieve
houding van
consensus' rekenen,
ligt dit heden ten
is aan
verval onderhevig en wordt niet
langer gekenmerkt door een
Hoe anders
dage. Het politieke midden
spreekwoordelijke consensus over
de uitgangspunten van het buitenlands beleid. Dat laatste is mede een
niet zonder gevolgen voor het
buitenlands beleid kon blijven,
bleek op 1 juni 2005, toen het
gevolg van de opkomst van
populistische, meer naar binnen
gekeerde, eurosceptische en anti-
wantrouwen tegen de politieke elite
een uitweg vond in het "nee" tegen
de Europese grondwet en daarmee
tegen de EU als een per definitie
interventionistische flankpartijen,
die door hun omvang een zodanige
invloed hebben op het electorale
speelveld, dat het midden zich qua
buitenlands-politieke koers wel
moet aanpassen. Europa, NAVO,
ontwikkelingsgeld en defensie zijn,
verdacht eliteproject.
Vanuit de toekomst van het
Nederlands buitenlands beleid
bezien is echter wezenlijker dat de
periode-Balkenende ook model
staat voor een vérgaande erosie van
de politieke constellatie waarop het
naoorlogs Nederlands buitenlands
beleid in zijn fundamentele
oriëntaties traditioneel heeft gerust.
Dat beleid, gericht op de drieslag
Communautaire integratie,
Atlantische verankering en een
multilateraal ingebedde inter-
nationale rechtsorde, kon bogen op
onvoorwaardelijke steun van de
kortom, niet langer onomstreden.
Een omstandigheid die in tijden van
bezuinigingen zoveel zwaarder
weegt, zeker vanuit de wetenschap
dat deze sectoren in de eigen
samenleving geen natuurlijke of
onomstreden'constituency' hebben.
Van
9/11 naar?
Tot slot valt het
tijdperk-
Balkenende samen met het begin
van een periode van toenemende
[2el
KRt\c v(DR l\TI-]R\ATIO\ÁLE Bl:t Rt:KKr\cEN
instabiliteit, van crises en van
onzekerheid binnen het internationale bestel. Het omslagpunt
wordt ontegenzeggelijk gevormd
door de aanslagen op de Twin
Towers. Die vonden weliswaar
plaats tijdens het laatste jaar van
Paars Il, maar de gevolgen lieten
zich tijdens de
kabinetten-
Balkenende voelen. De invallen van
de Amerikanen - militair gesteund
door de Britten in Afghanistan
(2001) en lrak [2003J, onder de
noemer van de 'war on terror',
hebben de
internationale
verhoudingen in deze periode
zwaar onder druk gezet
-
op allerlei
de laatste
niet in
plaats in de relatie tussen de
Verenigde Staten en hun
niveaus, maar
bondgenoten.
De onenigheid betrof o.a. het
VoL.l7(2) GLoBA^r.
landen als Duitsland en Frankrijk
onder druk zou zetten én dat het
Amerikaanse beleid op gespannen
voet stond met het door Nederland
beleden multilateralisme. Daarbij is
het hooguit een schrale troost dat
de Amerikaanse doelstellingen 'making the world saíe for
democracy' - op het eerste gezicht
stroken met de door Nederland
nagestreefde versterking van de
internationale rechtsorde. Maar of
het Amerikaanse optreden die
rechtsorde metterdaad sterker
heeft gemaakt, mag mede in het
licht van het beleden unilateralisme
zeer worden betwijfeld.
AÍghanistan en lrak zijn
bovendien slechts tlvee voorbeelden van de problemen waarmee de
internationale gemeenschap het
afgelopen decennium heeft
unilaterale karakter van het
Amerikaanse optreden; de gevolgen
geworsteld. Noord-Korea, Iran en
het vraagstuk van proliferatie; het
ervan voor de internationale
stabiliteit en veiligheid, alsmede
voor de betrekkingen met de
conflict in het Midden-Oosten; de
islamitische wereld; en de vraag of
dat niet genoeg is, de
de Amerikaanse doelstellingen in
termen van duurzame 'regime
financieel-economische crisis sinds
'the great depression' en
change'hoe dan ook wel realistisch
waren. Dat Nederland zich hierbij in
en klimaatverandering - het zijn
een lastig pakket bevond, was op
voorhand duidelijk. Trouw
instabiliteit in de
Russische
periferie en Centraal-Azië; en, alsof
ernstigste
de
'sluipende crisis' van de schaarste
allemaal illustraties van
de
als
instabiliteit en onzekerheid binnen
bongenoot en beducht als het was
het huidige internationale bestel.
Een bestel dat bovendien - zcr
en is voor de aantasting van de
transatlantische band, stond het
gaan met de Verenigde
wordt iedere dag duidelijker - een
ingrijpende verschuiving van de
internationale verhoudingen laat
zien in de vorm van 'the rise of the
wetende dat dit
rest'.
onder Balkenende voor de keuze al
dan niet politiek en militair mee te
i30l
Staten,
de relaties met EU-
KRIN(i v(X)R INTERNATToNALE
BETREKKTN(iEN
In het licht van deze instabiliteit,
onzekerheid en veranderingen is
in
GLoBAAL
van mensenrechten, fragiele staten,
Toch continuïteit?
het
VoL_ | 7(2)
zekere zin
niet
verbazingwekkend dat wat betreft
de uitgqngspunten van
het
Nederlands buitenlands beleid
-
accentyerschuivingen daargelaten
de kabinetten-Balkenende een àoge
mdte van contínui:teit vertonen met
het beleid van daarvoor, dus ook in
vergeli)king met de paarse
voorgangers.ae Dat mag zeker niet
verbazen voor een land dat het
moet hebben van internationale
stabiliteit en veiligheid, open en
groeiende exportmarkten, stabiele
en monetaire verhoudingen, zowel mondiaal als
financiële
Europees, en dat weet dat het op
eigen kracht niet in staat is dit alles
te waarborgen. Dan rest in eerste
instántie geen andere keuze dan in
te zetten op een
effectieí
multilateraal bestel, versterking van
de internationale rechtsorde,
verzekering van de trans-
Atlantische band en behoud van de
communautaire dimensie van de
Europese integratie.
Dat zijn dan ook de íjkpunten
die, in wisselende bewoordingen en
accentuerin& te vinden zijn in de
regeerakkoorden en beleidsstukken
bijdrage via het 3D-concept aan
stabilisatie van conflictgebieden,
aandacht voor specifieke regio's als
dat van de Grote Meren, de
noodzaak het VN-systeem te
hervormen, armoedebestrijding, en
wat al niet meer. Maar ook deze
operationele uitwerkingen passen
in essentie naadloos in de klassieke
drieslag die al tientallen jaren het
buitenlands beleid qua oriëntatie
dicteertr Europa, Atlantica en de
wereldorde.
Eén voorbeeld betreft de inzet
op de Europese Unie. In de aanloop
naar het grondwettelijk verdrag
toont Nederland zich - o.a. in
Benelux-verband - een krachtig
pleitbezorger van behoud en
versterking van de Communautaire
methode. Vooral de door de grote
lidstaten ingebrachte voorstellen
tot een vaste voorzitter van de
Europese Raad te komen, worden
zeer terughoudend ontvangen.
Toenmalig staatssecretaris voor
Europese Zaken Nicolai sprak zelfs
van de introductie van
een
'Europese zonnekoning', daarmee
een Franse greep naar de macht in
de Unie suggererend. In ieder geval
werd dit voorstel als bedreigend
gezien voor
de positie van
Europese Commissie,
en
de
daarmee
waarin de uitgangspunten yan het
voor de kleinere
buitenlands beleid van
Traditioneler kan het welhaast niet.
En natuurliik, na het'nee'tegen de
kabinetten-Balkenende
zijn
de
verwoord; ijkpunten die ingekleurd
worden via specifieke en in de tijd
wisselende prioriteiten ten aanzien
lidstaten.
Europese grondwet
sloeg
Nederland een behoudender toon
aan onder de noemer
van
t3ll
vol.l7(2) CLoBAAT.
KRrN(i vo()R lNTr,RN^ Íx)N^1.Ê BETREKKIN(iIN
subsidiariteit. Maar dat belette
uiteindelijk niet de aanname van
een nieuw verdrag dat, de
symboliek van de verpakking
daargelaten, in hoofdlijnen het
- als puntje bij
paaltje komt, Nederland tijdens de
kabinetten-Balkenende nog krachtig lijdt aan de 'Atlantische reflex'.
Zie lrak, zie Afghanistan en zie ook
deze hoekstenen zijn
eerder voor de regering acceptabele
grondwettelijk verdrag weerspiegelde. En ook nu, kritiek vanuit
de kamer ten spijt, gaat Nederland
mee met maatregelen ter bezwering
van de financieel-economische en
begrotingscrisis binnen de Unie. De
toon is nog immer, zelfs als in plaats
van Europese integratie over
het klakkeloos volgen van de
Amerikanen in hun steun voor
Israël in het Midden-Oostenconflict.
Het hoeft in dit licht dan ook niet te
verbazen dat minister Verhagen bij
Europese samenwerkíng wordt
gesproken, dat die samenwerking -
mondiale
weliswaar zoals in het verleden met
mate en niet als doel op zich zelí
waar dit het Nederlands
belang
dient, versterkt moet worden.so
Eenzelfde continuïteil
is
waarneembaar op het Atlantisch
vlak. Boxhoorn heett gelijk als hij
erop wijst dat de NAVO in recente
beleidsdocumenten niet langer als
de hoeksteen maar als 'slechts' een
van de t\,vee hoekstenen van het
Nederlands veiligheidsbeleid wordt
de opening van het Leidse
academisch jaar op 1 september
nog eens benadrukte dat Nederland
geen andere keuze heeft dan te
investeren in
de
de NAVO en de EU.
lmmers: '[d]eze drie uitgangspunten geven richting aan het
organisaties,
Nederlands buitenlands beleid.'s2
Tot slot kan hier op de middelen
worden gewezen. De krijgsmacht
mag er in de ogen van De Wijk
bekaaid van afgekomen zijn tijdens
de kabinetten-Balkenende,s3 maar
Nederland beschikt binnen het
gezelschap van de kleinere NAVOlidstaten als een van de weinige nog
immers over een kriigsmacht die
bestempeld.'r De EU heeft zich via
binnen het hogere
haar vooralsnog
spectrum een bijdrage kan leveren
aan interventies. Of dat zo blijft?
embryonale
defensiebeleid in de visie van de
regering blijkbaar reeds tot fweede
hoeksteen onrr,vikkeld. Hierbii zij
opgemerkt dat in de beschreven
periode Nederland minder krampachtig met het Europese defensiebeleid omgaat, maar dit altijd steunt
onder de voorwaarde dat dit niet
ten koste gaat van de Atlantische
cohesie. Maar ook dan geldt dat -
dit
nog los van de vraag hoe stevig
[32]
gewelds-
Dat is aan een volgend kabinet.
Waarbii zij aangetekend dat in de
afgelopen periode juist aan de inzet
van de krijgsmacht een nieuwe
legitimatie is gegeven via het 3Dconcept: de geïntegreerde bijdrage
van militairen, ontwikkelaars
diplomaten aan stabilisatie
en
en
wederopbouw. Mede in dat kader is
ook de
OS-inspanning
oP
Peil
VoL.l7(2) Gt.oBAAL
KRrN(i vooR INTERNATIoN^r.E BI-ïRtiKKINcFrN
gebleven, evenals de investering in
het bilaterale en
multilaterale
postennetwerk en de bijdrage aan
multilaterale instellingen;
zelfs
waar het ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsbeleid en het multilaterale
bestel uit oogpunt van efficiency en
effectiviteit wellicht een kritischer
boÍ
events'
Turkije en het bereiken
Continuïteit dus, bij
alle
te beoordelen
vanuit de'events'? Dan is het beeld
gemengd.
Op Europees vlak was
er
allereerst het Raadsvoorzitterschap
van de tweede helft van 2004, dat
door het aantreden van een nieuw
gekozen Europees Parlement en
een nieuwe Europese Commissie
onder moeilijke
omstandigheden
moest worden volbracht.
periode waarin Nederland
De
als
voorzitter echt zaken kon doen,
ving feitelijk pas aan op 1 november
2004, toen na veel problemen de
eerste Commissie-Barroso
werkzaamheden
teiten domineerden de Nederlandse
besluit te nemen over een begin van
toetredings-onderhandelingen met
verandering en onzekerheid. Ja,
misschien wel te veel continuïteit.
Maar bij deze continuïteit geldt ook
voor de kabinetten-Balkenende de
bekende uitspraak van de Britse
premier Macmillan, die, gevraagd
wat de grootste uitdaging voor een
staatsman is, antwoordde:'Events,
my dear boy, events.' Hoe valt de
periode-Balkenende
nieuwe lidstaten was uitgebreid.
Effectieve besluiworming binnen
een EU van 25 was dan ook de
eerste prioriteit van het voorzitterschap. Twee inhoudelijke prioriagenda daarbij: de noodzaak een
behandeling hadden verdiend.sa
'Events, my dear
het reilen en zeilen van een EU die
op 1 mei van dat jaar met tien
haar
kon
beginnen.
Daarnaast was Nederland als eerste
voorzitter verantwoordelijk voor
van
overeenstemming over een nieuw
samenwerkingsprogramma inzake
justitie- en politieaangelegenheden.
In beide opzichten wist Nederland
het voorzitterschap succesvol af te
sluiten.ss Dat geldt ook voor een
ander lastig dossier, dat in 2005
onder het Britse voorzitterschap
werd uitonderhandeld: de beperking van de Nederlandse afdrachten
aan de EU. Mede door interventie
van premier Blair
slaagde
Nederland er in het kader van de
Fín a ncíël e perspectieven 2 007 -2 0 1 3
in een korting van een miljard euro
te verwerven.
Maar de echte vuurproef op het
Europese vlak ontstond natuurlijk
op l juni 2005, toen - na
een
overigens zielloze campagne van
het kabinet - de Nederlandse
bevolking zich in grote meerder-
heid tegen het door de regering en
een groot deel van de Tweede
Kamer gesteunde grondwettelijk
verdrag uitsprak. Nederland had
daarbij het geluk dat het door het
eerdere Franse 'non' niet alleen
stond. De uitdaging
voor
133l
KRt\c vooR INTER\A-no\^l
F
Balkenende c.s. was vervolgens een
zodanig begrip
te kweken bij
partners voor de
de
Nederlandse
positie, dat deze bereid zouden zijn
onderhandelingen aan te gaan over
een nieuwe verdrag, dat naar
inhoud, benaming en omvang
wezenlijk zou af\,rrijken van de
Europese grondwet. Een inzet die
werd vastgelegd in het regeer-
akkoord van het
Vor l7(2) CLoBAAL
[]l:TRFKKT\(its\
KRIN(; vd)R INTERNATToNALE BETREKKl}JcEN
gebrachte doctrinaire ontwikkeling,
Spanningen aan de ankers
oververtegenwoordigd is. Het
bestel moet nu gered worden via
volkenrechtelijk mandaat en met
inzet van een daarop toegesneden
krijgsmacht een actieve bijdrage
wenste te leveren aan veiligheid en
stabiliteit op mondiaal niveau. Een
het interventionisme staat de
periode-Balkenende ook model
Met de problemen rond 'Europa' en
het informele gremium van de G20.
Of dat lukt, is volstrekt onduidelÍjk.
Maar voor Nederland is wel
duidelijk dat de G20 een voorbode
is van de toekomst. De groten
waarbij Nederland onder de
voorwaarde van een adequaat
liberaal-interventionisme
wonderwel aansluit bij
dat
het
kabinet-
grondwettelijk beleden gebod de
Balkenende lV. Mede dankzij een
zeer behulpzaam en effectief Duits
voorzitterschap werden de Neder-
versterken. Dit activisme staat daarnaast niet los van de wens de band
landse eisen
in belangrijke
mate
gehonoreerd, wat resulteerde in
een nieuwe verdragstekst, die de
regering zelfs in staat stelde een
volgend referendum over
het
internationale rechtsorde
met de Verenigde Staten
te
te
behouden of aan te halen en voor
Nederland zelf een plaats aan tafel
te garanderen. 'Met de kennis van
nu'kan echter op zijn minst gesteld
nieuwe verdrag te ontlopen.s6 Het
worden dat dit activisme
succes voor Nederland was daarbij
keerzijde heeft (gehadJ. Los van de
vraag of deze interventies - in het
bijzonder die in Afghanistan - het
beoogde doel, te weten stabiliteit,
vooral dat de gevreesde reputatieschade als gevolg van het'nee', met
dank aan dwarsliggers als Polen,
uiteindelijk erg meeviel.sT
Naast de EU als rode draad zal
de periode-Balkenende toch vooral
herinnerd worden als een tijdperk
waarin Nederland een grote
bereidheid toonde een actieve
bijdrage te leveren aan stabilisatieoperaties, die heel sterk in het licht
stonden van de door de Verenigde
Staten geleide 'oorlog tegen het
terrorisme', De politieke steun aan
de Amerikaans-Britse interventie in
Irak, maar vooral de actieve inzet
van militairen in zowel Irak (SFIR-
operatieJ als Afghanistan (ISAF),
passen geheel in een onder de
kabinetten-Balkenende op gang
Í341
een
dichterbil hebben gebracht, mag
sterk betwiifeld worden of Nederland zich met zijn actieve inzet
enige invloed of positie heeft
verworyen. Veeleer lijkt het zo te
zijn dat de sterke Atlantische
orièntatie irritatie heeft gewekt bij
Europese partners en
de
binnenlands-politiek afgedwongen
beëindiging van de lsAF-missie de
relatie met de Amerikanen onder
druk heeft gezet. Kortom, aan alle
kanten verlies.
voor de spanningen waarmee het
Nederlands buitenlands beleid
steeds meer te maken krijgt. Die
spanningen betreffen primair de
ankers. De NAVO bestaat nog, maar
worstelt met haar missie. Het deze
beslissingen en Nederland staat
buiten spel, alle inspanningen van
Balkenende c.s. om op het
klapstoeltje te mogen aanschuiven
maand overeen te komen nieuw
Strategisch Concept zal in dit
opzicht geen soelaas bieden. Kiest
Nederland
bovendien de internationale rechtsorde als richtsnoer voor zijn
men voor een accent op
de
klassieke taak van collectieve
verdediging, dan is daarmee
eigenlijk de overbodigheid van de
organisatie onder
gebracht: immers,
woorden
verdediging
tegen wie? Volgt men daarentegen
de Amerikaanse lijn yan actief
optreden buiten het eigen verdrags-
gebied, dan komen alle politieke
tegenstellingen die de organisatie
zozeer parten hebben gespeeld in
Irak en Afghanistan, in
heftigheid weer naar boven.
enige redding is dan dat
alle
De
de
Verenigde Staten géén beroep op
het
bondgenootschap
doen,
waarmee dan feitelijk eveneens zijn
doodvonnis is getekend.
Het anker van het multilaterIle
bestel als drager van
de
internationale rechtsorde biedt
eveneens minder houvast. Dit
stelsel verkeert in een ernstige
legitimiteits- en effectiviteitscrisis,
o.a. omdat Europa, en daarmee
Nederland, binnen dit bestel zwaar
ten spijt. Waar
buitenlands beleid kent, heeft de
recente periode van actief
interventionisme laten zien dat dit
zowel in eigen land als het
buitenland geen 'free lunch' is.
Draagvlak
in eigen land is
een
voorwaarde maar in het geheel niet
gegarandeerd, terwijl in het
buitenland reputatieschade voortdurend op de loer ligt. Bovendien is
wel duidelijk geworden dat de
internationale rechtsorde bij gebrek
aan internationale
overeen-
stemming over wat deze inhoudt,
per definitie geen houvast biedt, al
helemaal niet als de belangrijkste
bondgenoot zich hoe
dan
ook
weinig aan dit soort begrippen
gelegen laat liggen. Dan wordt een
beroep erop al snel een schaamlap
voor de 'veilige' keuze voor de grote
bondgenooL
Tot slot, de Europese Unie. Wie
de wereld van de toekomst op zich
af ziet komen, kan welhaast niet
anders concluderen dan dat
Nederland meer zal moeten
[35]
KRrN(i vooR INl F.RNAl loNAt-F. BFTREKKNGEN
VoL.l7(2) GT.()BAAL
inzetten op de EU, o.a. als schakel
Ten derde, en wel heel kenmerkend,
naar dat mondiale niveau.
wordt steeds duidelijker dat een
inzet op een actief buitenlands
Maar
juist dan is opvallend dat Nederland
zich in de periode-Balkenende, o.a.
als gevolg van het
binnenlandspolitieke klimaat, gemiddeld
terughoudend en reactief opstelde
ten aanzien van de EU. Wezenlijk
beleid meer en meer schuurt met
een naar binnen gekeerd binnenlands discours, en dat dan voor een
land dat zich zo aÍhankelijk weet
van de buitenwereld.
daarbij is de worsteling met de
in die van de
toekomst, steeds
minder van doen heeft met de
werkelijkheid en dat derhalve een
garantie vormt voor teleurstelling
en verongelijktheid. Die werkeliikheid is immers dat het voor wat ou
fond een klein land is, een steeds
grotere opgave wordt om gezien te
worden en serieus te
worden
genomen, dat Nederland op eigen
kracht weinig kan en dat het
eigen positie binnen de Unie.
Objectief bezien is Nederland van
Het zelÍbeeld staat in de weg
'founding father'tot een van de vele
Voor een nieuw kabinet zullen deze
daarom is
uitdagingen onverminderd gelden.
Bij minder middelen en een lastiger
binnenlands-politiek klimaat zal het
buitenlands beleid gevoerd moeten
worden binnen kaders die minder
samenwerking met anderen. Bij het
lidstaten geworden. Maar van de
weeromstuit lijkt
Nederland
gekozen te hebben voor een
buitenlands beleid waarbij het
behoud van de erge, positie
leidraad is: de eigen positie in de
G20, in het IMF, in de Wereldbank,
enz.: een achterhoedegevecht in het
licht van de verschuivende internationale machtspanelen; een
achterhoedegevecht dat het laatste
anker - dat van de EU - alleen maar
zwakker maakt.
De periode-Balkenende staat,
kortom, voor een tijdperk waarin
Nederland met drie uitdagingen is
geconfronteerd. Ten eerste worden
de risico's van het zelfuerkozen
internationaal activisme
daarmee van de inzet
en
op
versterking van de internationale
rechtsorde pijnlijk duidelijk, niet in
de laatste plaats in eigen land. Ten
fweede is Nederland in deze periode
geconfronteerd met het gegeven dat
het kleiner wordt in een grotere
wereld, met als reactie een neiging
tot positiebehoudi een beleid dat op
termijn geen uitkomst zal bieden.
i36l
houvast bieden. lnzet
aangewezen
op
uitstippelen van zo'n'realistisch'
buitenlands beleid zit ons zelfbeeld
ons, kortom, slechts in de weg.
op
continuïteit biedt dan geen uitweg.
Dat beleid zal bovendien alleen
effectief kunnen zijn vanuit een
goed begrip van de Nederlandse
4? Zie o.a. Rob de Wijk, 'Balkenendes
defensie: doorgaand verval met behoud
van kwaliteit' in:
lnternqtionale
Specfator, september 2OlO, blz. 454458.
belangen en van de wijze waarop
deze belangen het beste kunnen
a8
zo'n
exercitie lijkt een kritische analyse
van het eigen ze[beeld een eerste
2006 over het zenden van troepen naar
worden behartigd. Voor
voorwaarde. Dat zelfbeeld wordt
sterk bepaald door de perceptie dat
Nederland als middelgrote mogendheid, als 16d" economie in de
wereld, als belangrijke investeerder
en exporteur, en als wat al niet
meer, toch per definitie door
anderen serieus zo\ moeten
worden genomen. Inderdaad,
Nederland als voorbeeld, als
bruggenbouwer, als land dat
bijzondere relaties met de groten
heeft, enz. Het is een zelfbeeld dat
in de wereld van vandaag, en zeker
vol.17(2) GLOBÀÀL
KRINO VOOR INTÊRNATIONALE BF,TREKKINCEN
Dit wordt onderstreept door
de
moeizame besluitvorming binnen het
tweede kabinet-Balkenende in januari
Irak in het kader van de VNgemandateerde stabilisatieoperatie
aldaar en over de verlenging van de
Uruzgan-missie in november 2007.
4e Zie voor een bespreking van het
Paarse buitenlandse beleid de diverse
biidragen in de /r?fernatíonale Spectator,
april 2002 (blz. 17 7 -198).
so Als er één onderwerp is waar
Nederland aantoonbadr op de rem is
gaan staan na het 'nee' tegen de
Europese grondwet, dan betreft dat de
verdere uitbreiding van de EU. Op dat
thema heeft Nederland mede n.a.v. de
weigering in te stemmen met het
aanhalen van de banden met Servië de
reputatie van'dwarsligger' verworven.
s1 Bram Boxhoorn, 'De val van het
kabinet-Balkenende IV: het einde aan
een
Atlantische reflex?', in:
Internationale Spectator, juni 2010, blz.
324-327.
s2 Maxime Verhagen, 'Veranderende
wereld, vaste waarden: Nederlands
buitenlands beleid in de 21" eeuw', in:
Internationqle Specfofor, oktober 2008,
blz.507-51,2.
s3 De WijK d.w' noot 47.
s4 Zie in dit verband de WRR-studie
Mínder pretentíe, meer ambitie, Den
Haag WR& 2010.
ss Zie voor een bespreking van het
Nederlands voorzitterschap
o.a.
Mendeltje van Keulen & Alfred Pijpers,
Chairing the enlorged Union: The
Netherlands' 2004 EU Council
Presidency, The Hague: Clingendael
Institute, april2005.
s6 Zie over de totstandkoming van het
Verdrag van Lissabon en de
Nederlandse inzet o.a. Ian Rood,
Mendeltje van Keulen & Bas Limonard,
Nederland, de EU en het Verdrag van
Líssabon, Den Haag: Instituut
Clingendael, april 2008.
s7 Qua reputatie dreigde uiteindelijk
grotere schade als gevolg van de film
FITNA; een zaak die eveneens met een
sisser afliep.
Dit artikel is met uitdrukkelijke toestemming volledig overgenomen uit
de
lnternotionole Spectator van november 2010. Marieke Doolaard en Jan Rood
zijn verbonden aan het Haagse Instituut Clingendael, respectieveliik als
stagiaire en als hoofd strategisch onderzoek.
t37l
KRING VooR INTERNATIONAIE BETREKKINGEN
VoL.l7(2) Gr,ona.q.L
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